

DDA REGISTRY
FILE: Security - 4

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date
		6 APR 1981
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. EO/DDA		6 APR 1981
2.		
3.		
4. D/OIS		
5.		
Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

4. For your action per note from Executive Secretary on Form 3637. Pls note 9 April deadline (DCI going out of town on 10 April).

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

EO/DDA

Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

☆ U.S.GPO: 1978-0-261-647 3354

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/RM				
4	DD/NEA				
5	D/DCI/CT				
6	DD/A	X			
7	DD/O		X		
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	EC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/PPPM				
16	AO/DCI				
17	PB/NSC				
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE 9 April
Date

Remarks:

To 6: Please provide comment--coordinated with DDO--to DCI along with a response for the DCI's signature.

STAT

D/Executive Secretary
6 April 1981

Date

BEST COPY
AVAILABLE



APR 2 1981

Mr. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

As you may know, the Central Intelligence Agency in 1979 offered to the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) for opening to public use Office of Strategic Services records that have been in your care since the dissolution of OSS. At that time, mutually agreeable restrictions on access to the records apparently had been worked out: (1) C.I.A. screening was to withhold documents containing names of sources still requiring protection; (2) NARS' subsequent review was to insure the continued protection of non-OSS originated information still requiring security classification, as well as foreign government information. This has been our practice during the past 5 years in reviewing OSS Research and Analysis Division and other military records containing OSS documents.


When the first increment was transferred to NARS, however, CIA went a step further with a specific requirement that we withhold names of all persons affiliated with OSS. To date attempts to resolve this discrepancy have been unsuccessful. We do not understand the reasons for this further restriction because to our knowledge CIA screeners do not themselves delete all names, certainly not those of deceased persons or those whose OSS affiliation is a matter of proud public knowledge.

From our standpoint, too, this restriction would be unworkable and would effectively negate the original purpose of the transfer of the records, which was to make public as much of the OSS story as possible, within the limits of present national security considerations. Screening documents for individual names would be a resource-consuming operation. The documents released following such a screening, moreover, would be too limited and fragmentary to be useful to most researchers or satisfy their interests. Such a situation is likely to provoke acute researcher dissatisfaction and stimulate many objections and demands under the Freedom of Information Act, which would absorb still more staff time, both ours and yours.

on file GSA release instructions
apply

We are still hopeful, nevertheless, that our two agencies can devise a reasonable resolution between the public's need to know and our Government's security requirements, and between that need to know and the right of privacy of public servants, as well as as private citizens.

Sincerely,



ROBERT M. WARNER
Archivist of the United States